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Origins
The origins of the Bangladesh army lie more than 200
years back in the mercantile period of British
expansion when representatives of its commercial
capital arrived in India to trade and plunder. The
first of the native armed forces commanded by
foreigners were the armies organised by government-
sponsored companies, such as the British East India
Company. Without these forces, this foreign capital
could not have penetrated to the extent that it did,
nor have been as financially successful. Thus, even in
this early period, the army played an important role
in development, albeit the development of Britain
and the underdevelopment of India.
When the British government took over direct rule,
the East India Company's army became the Indian
army. This was ultimately developed into the largest
and most effective colonial army in the world. With
it, Britain extended its control over India and other
areas, suppressed local uprisings, and contained the
growing nationalist movement in the 20th century.
It was even able to use the Indian army
extensively against the challenge of other imperial
powers in World Wars land II. The British governing
class, with the confidence and skill developed over
centuries, accomplished this difficult task only
through careful recruitment, training and organi-
sation of Indian soldiers.
At the beginning, recruitment naturally came from
the areas first conquered by Britain: Bombay,
Madras, and especially Bengal. But after the entire
Bengal army revolted against the British in the
famous Mutiny of 1857, the 82 Bengal regiments
were disbanded and further recruitment from this
area was banned until 1910. Subsequently, the
British developed the myth of the martial races which
survives to this day in India and Pakistan, if in a
somewhat attenuated form. According to this myth,
there existed in India certain ethnic, regional or caste
groups that were vigorous, courageous and warlike,
and which ought to be recruited into the army. Most
recruitment for Britain's Indian army after 1857 was
done in India's north-west regions, from the
Punjabis, Dogras, Jats and the Gurkhas from Nepal.
The British protected these groups and encouraged
them to regard themselves as superior. It is
significant that education and political consciousness
tended to be less widespread in these areas than in
Bengal or Madras.
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On the other hand, there were other 'races' who did
not possess the required martial spirit. The Bengalis
were decidedly placed in the latter category. The
contempt for the Bengali population shown by the
Pakistan army at the time of the crackdown in 1971
can in part be traced to these theories of racial
superiority.
The Indian army was effectively insulated from the
growing nationalist movement in the 1920s and 1930s
against which it was often used, although during
World War II this insulation began to break down.
With the partition of British India into independent
India and Pakistan virtually all the Muslim officers
and soldiers trained by Britain joined the armed
forces of the Islamic State of Pakistan. These two
vivisected halves of the original Indian army fought
their first skirmishes in 1948 over the control of
Kashmir.
Post-Independence: the Pakistan army
This conservative and 'anti-national' military
establishment inherited from the Empire became the
armed protector of the post-colonial State. The
experience of the nationalist struggle left a good deal
of resentment against military institutions. But in
Pakistan there was almost no thought of tampering
with the traditional military structure.
Pakistan was officially an Islamic State and its rulers
had little of the socialist, secular, and 'non-aligned'
character of the Congress Party government in India.
The US began providing it with military and
economic assistance in 1951, and when Pakistan
joined Dulles' two anti-Communist alliances, SEATO
and CENTO, that aid increased. By 1969 Pakistan
had received up to $2,000 mn. in American military
assistance and $3,000 mn. in economic aid. A large
US military mission trained, equipped, and advised
the armed forces. The army expanded rapidly, more
than tripling its manpower between 1947 and 1971,
and acquired sophisticated weaponry from the United
States. A US government report stated in 1962:
"From a political viewpoint, US military aid has
strengthened Pakistan's armed services, the greatest
stabilizing force in the country . . ." (quoted in
Feroze Ahmed 1962: 429).
US military assistance converted the Pakistan army
into the dominant political force and chief defender
of the propertied classes in the country. The
increased strength and confidence of the army was
demonstrated in its seizure of power in the 1958 coup
d'etat. The coup was led by Sandhurst-trained
General Ayub Khan, who later admitted consulting
US officials, including the director of the CIA, Allen
Dulles, before taking power.
Army rule only exacerbatèd the conflict between East
and West Pakistan. It prevented the former from
using its larger population in parliamentary elections
to obtain policies favourable to its own interests. It
also meant greater economic exploitation of the
East. The military consumed as much as 60 per cent
of Pakistan's budget. Foreign exchange derived
mainly from jute exports from the East was drawn
upon to purchase foreign weapons especially after
the 1965 war with India when most US military
assistance was cut off. Yet most military troop
deployment was in the West and the East gained
little from military spending and the jobs it created.
The Pakistan army continued the British pattern of
recruiting mainly among the 'martial races' of the
Punjab and Northwest Frontier Province. Bengalis
made up less than 10 per cent of an army estimated in
1971 at 350,000 although they constituted 56 per cent
of the national population. And only two out of the
top 50 officers in post-Independence Pakistan were
Bengalis.
The growing economic disparity between East and
West, the former's lack of a voice in its own affairs,
the geographical absurdity of the country to begin
with, and the great cultural differences between the
two regions combined to produce an increasingly
potent nationalist brew in the East. Accumulated
grievances burst forth in large-scale student and
workers riots during 1968-69, leading to the fall of
the Ayub regime. A new military administration
calling itself an interim government promised
nation wide elections. These were held in December
1970 and fought on the issue of provincial autonomy.
The Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
won an overwhelming victory in East Bengal with a
large enough majority to dominate the new National
Assembly and make Mujib the next Prime Minister
of Pakistan. West Pakistani interests saw their
domination threatened, and the military regime of
Yahya Khan postponed the convening of the
Assembly. The Awami League responded by
organising a mass campaign of unarmed resistance.
The West Pakistani military rulers answered this
political challenge with one of the most brutal
military onslaughts seen in South Asia.
War of Independence
When the Pakistan army began its crackdown on the
night of March 25, 1971, thè first objective was to
disarm the Bengali units of the armed forces.' But this
proved to be more difficult than expected and resulted
in their rôvolt and armed resistance. Bengali units in
the armed forces had been moved by the nationalist
sentiment that swept the eastern wing of Pakistan.
These regular forces in the army and police formed
the initial core of the resistance, but had no training
or experience in guerrilla warfare. They did not yet
know how to mobilise the overwhelming support of
the Bengali population and offset the greater number
of trained West Pakistani soldiers and their superior
firepower. In the two or three weeks after the
Pakistani crackdown began Bengali troops tried to
engage them in different parts of the country by
conventional tactics. These 'set-piece' battles proved
to be costly mistakes, resulting in the defeat of all
organised Bengali resistance by the end of April
1971. The remnants of the Bengali units crossed the
border into India with their officers.
The second phase of resistance to Pakistani
repression took three main forms. The first, which
may be termed the 'official' resistance, came directly
out of the post-colonial army tradition. It was made
up of the regular Bengali units guided by a
conventional approach to military matters. This
group is best represented by Majors Saflullah and
Khaled Musharraf, who became top-level sector
commanders, and above all by Colonel M. A. G.
Osmany, a retired East Pakistani military officer who
was appointed Commander of the resistance forces
by the Awami League government in exile. Their
approach was to organise all the trained Bengali
military personnel into conventional units which
would operate from bases in India. And their
political goal was to bring an Awami League
government to power in Bangladesh s soon as
possible by whatever means including direct Indian
intervention.
The Indian government had decided by the middle of
April 1971, that it was in its own national interest to
aid the resistance in East Pakistan. India had fought
two inconclusive wars with Pakistan since Indepen-
dence and saw this as the opportunity of the century
to cut its enemy to size and assert itself as the
dominant power in the region. The Indian Congress
Party government also desired to bring to power an
1 The Bengali armtd forces in East Pakistan at the time were
six battalions of the East Bengal Regiment (EBR), number-
ing about 6,000 men, plus 13-14,000 lightly-armed troopa
of the border security force, the East Pakistan Riffes (EPR).
In addition there were some 45,000 police in the province,
not all armed, who mostly went over to the resistance, as
well a others in home-guard type militias. General Osmany,
the retired East Pakistani army officer who took command
of the Bangladesh liberation forces during the war was later
to say that the 'Bengali personnel in the army might well
have stayed neutral, had the Pakistani authorities confined
their crackdown to seleed Bengali politicians. It wa5 the
over-kill, the systematic 'elitocide' campaign to exterminate
professionals, intellectuals and army officers that decided them
to revolt.' (Palit p. 54).
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Awami League government in Bangladesh which was
similar in character to itself in its policies of
secularism and in its international alliances.
A second strategy centred around a number of
experienced officers who largely rejected the
strategic concepts being advanced by General
Osmany and Indian field commanders. This
dissident group was led by Majors Taher and
Ziauddin who had both been stationed in West
Pakistan when the crackdown began, but escaped
and joined the Bangladesh resistance. As sector
commanders of the Mukti Bahini, they rejected the
Bangladesh Command's view that all sectors should
establish their command headquarters on Indian
territory, and insisted to the contrary that both the
political capital and all military headquarters should
be based on Bangladesh soil.
They also argued against the formation of
conventional battalions. Instead they wanted all
experienced military personnel dispersed in the
districts of the country with orders to raise and train
peasant guerrilla battalions. Within a year Taher
estimated that a peasant army of more than 100,000
men could be raised. Emphasis was put on capturing
enemy equipment rather than relying on foreign
supplies. It was only through a 'people's war' that the
technical superiority of the Pakistani forces could be
defeated without foreign intervention. This was in
their view the only way Bangladeshis. would win
independence for themselves without Indian military
intervention to which they remained categorically
opposed.
The third form of resistance was the action by
civilians who armed themselves in all parts of
Bangladesh. Such groups ranged from those
activated by Marxist parties such as the East Bengal
Communist Party led by Abdul Matin to the private
forces of semi-bandit elements such as Kader
Siddiqui. But most groups arose without prior
organisational form and were led by the new young
patriots of the Bangladesh movement. It was with
these elements that military officers like Taher and
Ziauddin hoped to merge their trained personnel and
thus build an army of a type never seen before in
South Asia.
So we have seen the factors that inhibited the
development of a people's army and people's war:
the core of the resistance was the Bengali elements of
the Pakistan neo-colonial army with conventional
ideas of military strategy and acceptance of the
limited petty bourgeois nationalist political goals of
the Awami League. Indian tutelege reinforced these
tendencies. Another important factor was the
division of the left forces, especially the pro-Chinese
p«rties, and confusion over the national question
when China supported the unity of the Pakistan
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state. Nevertheless, the struggle in Bangladesh began
to move leftward. A split developed and widened,
between the Awami League politicians, who for the
most part were safely ensconced in the exile
government in 'Mujibnagar' (Calcutta), and the
military units fighting in the field. Yet in the final
analysis the Bangladesh resistance did not become a
people's war of national liberation because it did not
have time to develop before India stepped in.
Once war was declared on December 3, 1971, India
moved swiftly into East Pakistan with approximately
150,000 troopsroughly twice as many as Pakistan
had there. In a well-planned and executed operation
the Indian army defeated, skirted, or set to flight the
major Pakistan troop concentrations and surrounded
the capital, Dacca, in just two weeks. The lack of
fight in the Pakistan troops, commented on by a
number of observers, seems to have been largely due
to their feeling of isolation among a hostile
population. The Indian army commanders accepted
the surrender of the Pakistan army on December 16
with no representative of the Bangladesh govern-
ment-in-exile nor the Mukti Bahini even participating
in the ceremony. The Pakistani prisoners of war and
most of their weapons and equipment were quickly
taken off to camps in India.2 These and other actions
caused considerable resentment among the Bangla-
desh forces.
Pakistan was persuaded by Western governments to
release Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from prison in early
January, 1972, and he returned to a tumultuous
welcome in Dacca. One of the first tasks he set
himself was the disarming and disbanding of the
groups of freedom fighters, and the organising of his
army and 'security forces'. Indian and Awami
League planners had given thought to the situation
after Bangladesh had achieved its independence. The
Indian General D. K. Palit somewhat coyly reveals
that:
"(by October, 1971) some of former regular
personnel of the EBR were grouped into regular
units or sub-units in order to enable them to
operate alongside Indian army troops should the
need arise, particularly in the eastern sector.
Besides, the leaders of the Mukti Bahini must have
realised that when Bangladesh was eventually
liberated, the administration would feel the need
for a cadre of regular troopsfor internal security
roles to begin withand subsequently, to form the
nucleus of a Bangladesh army" (emphasis added)
(Palit, p.58).
2 Some four divisions worth of weapons and equipment were
taken away by the Indian army and never recovered by
Bangladesh, though in 1973, due to Bangladesh army pro-
tests, India did give them some old World War II artillery
pieces.
A Bangladesh army of 10,000 men initially was
formed on the lines f the Indian and Pakistan
armies with considerable Indian assistance. The
traditional, hierarchical structure with a professional
officer corps was re-asserted. Mujib promoted
General Osmany and moved him into his cabinet, but
refused to give him the Defence post for fear he
would have too much influence. The relatively pliant
Saflullah was promoted to command of the
Bangladesh army over the head of Ziaur Rahman, a
hero of the resistance who had actually declared the
independence of Bangladesh over Chittagong Radio
on March 26, the morning after the crack-down
began. Ziaur Rahman got the number two post, and
Mujib put the highly ambitious Khaled Musharraf in
as number three. Saflullah and Khaled, as was
mentioned above, were leading members of the first,
'official' stream of the resistance movement with its
conventional military approach and willingness to
depend on India for major assistance in winning
Bangladesh independence. Ziaur Rahman, however,
held something of an intermediate position between
the first and the second approaches. Although he
does not seem to have thought in terms of a socialist
future for Bangladesh, he was a nationalist who did
not want the country's independence to depend on
India and therefore had supported Taher in operating
his military command as much as possible from
within Bangladesh.
Those soldiers who wanted a new form of army were
over-ruled and if they persisted, expelled. A number
of outstanding young officers whose ideas had been
transformed by the experience of fighting in the
national liberation struggle were forced out. One of
these was Major M. A. Jalil, a Bengali officer who
had been on leave from his Pakistan regiment at the
time of the crack-down and had organised resistance
in his home area of Barisal. He then became the
commander for the ninth sector (Jessore-Khulna).
Immediately after the war he was arrested and
imprisoned for several months for trying to prevent
Indian troops from taking industrial machinery and
military weapons and equipment away to India.
Expelled from the army on his release, he helped to
found a new party, the JSD (Jatiyo Samajtantric Dal,
or 'patriotic socialist party'), which has been one of
the most active left-wing parties since. Except for a
two-week period after the soldiers' uprising of
November 1975, he has been in prison since 1974.
Two other examples are Lt. Colonels Ziauddin and
Abu Taher, mentioned above and both leading
advocates of the 'second stream' strategy of not
depending on India for support. After the war
Ziauddin was appointed commander of the Dacca
Brigadethe most important in the country. But six
months later he was sacked from his command and
expelled from the army. Ziauddin bad publicly called
for the abrogation of the government's alleged 'secret
treaties' believed to have been made with India
during the exile period, and had maintained that the
army ought to carry on to build a new socialist
Bangladesh, without Mujib if necessary. He also
opposed Mujib's creation of a parallel political army:
the Rakkhi Bakini. After his expulsion, Ziauddin
spent months travelling to all parts of Bangladesh,
and in extensive studying of Marxist works. He then
went underground to organise and fight with one of
the marxist revolutionary parties, the Sarbohara
('have-not's') party led by Siraj Sikdar.
Lt. Colonel Taher, who had commanded the
Mymensingh sector in the liberation struggle and had
lost a leg leading an assault on a Pakistani position,
was after Independence first appointed Adjutant
General of the army, in which position he brought
proceedings against high officers, including Saflullah,
for misappropriation of property. Then he became
commander of the Comilla brigade. Taher forcefully
advanced the position that the post-independence
Bangladesh army should be a 'people's army' that
would engage in construction and productive tasks so
as not to be a burden on the peasantry and had put
these concepts to work in his brigade. For this, he
and other like-minded officers became known within
the army as the 'plough soldiers'. Taher supported
Colonel Ziauddin in his clash with Mujib, and as a
result left the army but was given the direction of a
government dredging operation. In 1974 after most
radical left parties had been forced underground,
Taher began organising the secret Biplobi Sainik
Sangstha ('revolutionary soldiers' organisation')
within the army, which had links with the JSD party.
This soldiers' organisation was to play an important
role in the soldiers' uprising of November 1975.
Besides the army, a new type of explicitly political
armed force was also organised in Bangladesh with
Indian assistance: the Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini (JRB) or
'national security force'. Similar to the Indian
Central Reserve Police, the JRB was meant as both a
counter-weight to the army, which Mujib did not
fully trust, and as an 'internal security' instrument
to carry out operations of a political nature which it
was felt the police were incapable of handling. The
Rakkhi Bahini was frequently used to suppress
opposition political rallies and demonstrations,
control worker's strikes, pick up and interrogate
leftists, clear slum dwellers out of the capital, and so
forth.
The Rakkhi Bahini was trained by Indian army
officers in Bangladesh, but later, because of anti-
Indian sentiment, JRB officer candidateswho, often
had Awami League party connectionswere slFit to
be trained at India's military academy at Dehra Dun.
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The Rakkhi Bahini was organised along army lines,
but did not possess tanks, artillery, or planes. It did
have the latest small arms, however, like Russian
AK-47 automatics while the army was left with
World War II rifles. Large sums were expended on it
and it was built up to a size which rivalled the army:
more than 20,000 men by the end of 1974.
The formation of the Rakkhi Bahini caused
considerable resentment in the regular army. In
addition, the army had other grievances. For one
thing, it was Sheikh Mujib's political style to
encourage factions which he could play off against
each other, including in the military. The army also
resented the way it was used in civil operations.
Mujib had ordered the army out on April 24, 1974,
to conduct an all-out operation throughout the
country to recover unauthorised weapons, stop
smuggling, apprehend anti-social elements, and
prevent hoarding and profiteering of food grains.
Some of the people arrested for smuggling
foodgrains, however, turned out to have important
Awami League connections, and the army was soon
called off this operation. These grievances surfaced in
the army coup of August 15, 1975 which killed Mujib
and most of his family and overthrew his
government.
The domestic context of the coup
Often in military coups, the internal grievances of the
army are only the epiphenomena of important
underlying social dynamics. Thus it is necessary to
specify the international as well as the internal
context of the coup in its social, political and
economic dimensions, and identify the forces
operating through the military.
Bangladesh is perhaps unique for having in effect
deported its 'feudal' landed classwhich was mostly
Hinduto India in 1947, and then for having
deported its bourgeoisiemostly from West Pakistan
to Pakistan at Independence in 1971. The 'leading'
(but not actually 'dominant') classes that remained
can be roughly termed petit-bourgeois, and nearly all
of them were represented in the Awami League.
These included: traders and merchants of all sizes,
the bureaucracy, military officers, professionals,
contractors and rich peasants. There was also a small
productive bourgeoisie that Ayub Khan had begun to
foster as part of state policy in the 1960s. There were
certainly many common aspects in the interests and
outlook of these groups but they were by no means
identical. Once Independence was gained and the
Awami League took power, the divergence in their
interests increased. The interests of the Awami
League Party were not the same as any one class, nor
as a party were they necessarily the same as the
coalition of interests the party contained.
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When the Awami League took power after
Independence it began to take on some of the aspects
of a class itself. The larger economic interests
belonging to West Pakistanis were nationalised, and
put under the direction of people with close Awami
League connections. The party was in this respect
setting itself up as a bureaucratic bourgeoisie.
Smaller enterprises often went directly to party
members. The government also distributed licences
and import and export permits to party members
who re-sold them to genuine producers and traders.
A lucrative smuggling operation developed which
took rice and jute to India, and brought back
manufactured goods, an operation which depended
on the protection of important people in the party.
And finally, full use was made of the opportunities to
extract percentages for the award of contracts.
Most important of all, however, was the control over
huge amounts of foreign aid that came flooding into
the country. Over $2.5 billion in aid was received by
Bangladesh in the first three years of independence,
which is more than the total amount received by East
Pakistan in the previous 23 years, and more in
absolute dollar terms, than went to West Germany
under the Marshall Plan after World War II. A
substantial amount of this aid is believed however to
never have reached its intended recipients.
The situation described here reflects the petit
bourgeois class base of the Awami League in a
situation where it suddenly assumed control of the
government and acquired opportunities to appro-
priate surpluses by means which were previously
beyond its grasp. If the League had represented a
developed bourgeoisie things probably would have
been different. At least there would have been an
emphasis on production. Splits in the ruling party
which manifested themselves at the time of the 1975
coup when some sections of the party supported the
elimination of Mujib, suggest that a conflict was
developing between the petit bourgeois and the
nascent bourgeois elements with roots in production
rather than trade or the plunder of state resources.
The army, bureaucracy, and international capital
seem to have swung behind the latter.
Mujib also alienated the bureaucracy, which was not
accustomed to operating under the direction of a
political party at all. Mujib intervened in; its
operations in a blatantly political way. He promoted
his brother-in-law from a junior position in the civil
service to be the Joint Secretary of the Establishment
Divisiona key post which controlled all recruit-
ment, assignments and promotions in the civil
service. He also pushed through legislation which
allowed summary dismissal of any civil servant
without any possibility of review by the judiciary.
Most threatening of all, however, was a planned
major administrative reorganisation which was about
to be implemented when Mujib was overthrown. This
would have turned all 62 Sub-divisions of Bangladesh
into Districts, with local political councils in charge
of each, considerably undercutting the power of the
Civil Service.
There were also important developments in the
economy which had been severely disrupted by the
war of independence. Millions of people had fled to
India, communications were destroyed, and in-
dustrial installations damaged. This led to decline in
exports of jute and tea, the main earners of foreign
exchange. Thousands of trained Pakistani managers
and technicians left the country. These problems
were exacerbated by poor rice harvests. As a result
agricultural and industrial production had not fully
recovered pre-war levels by the time of the 1975
coup. During the same period the population
increased by about 12 per cent, resulting in a
substantial drop in net per capita domestic product.
These factors, combined with a substantial increase
in the money supply and a drastic increase in prices
for necessary imports including oil, food and
cement, produced inflation ranging between 40 and
100 per cent per year.
Corruption and failure to solve the economic
problems of the country eroded the Awami League
government's support and fostered militant oppo-
sition, especially from the JSD party. Mujib's
response was increasingly authoritarianto move in
the direction of a one-party State and to rely more
and more heavily on the Rakkhi Bahini. In
December 1974 a state of emergency was declared.
The following month the formation of a single
national party (BKSAL, "Bangladesh Peasants and
Workers People's League") with compulsory
membership for all civil servants, teachers, andjournalists was announced. The parliamentary
system of government was scrapped in favour of a
presidential one. In March Mujib announced his
'Second Revolution' which included a major
administrative re-organisation, compulsory co-
operative societies in each village, and the formation
of special 'judicial tribunals'. In April, all 100 Taka
currency notes were suddenly taken out of circulation
in a move aimed at smuggling and undeclared
earnings, though it also appears to have hit legitimate
trade and business badly. And in June, the
government announced it was cutting down the
number of daily newspapers to twoone in English
and one in Bengaliunder direct government
control.
The international dimension
There are two main levels at which international
forces can operate to produce a military coup in a
developing country. The first is by more or less
direct intervention by a developed country through
an agency such as the CIA. Imperialist forces have
shown themselves quite capable, through networks
developed over decades in the military and
intelligence establishments, of precipitating a coup.
Secondly, in a more subtle and sometimes not fully
intended manner, the developed countries set the
general economic conditions within which develop-
ing countries must operate. Sometimes international
creditors put them in a situation where it is virtually
impossible both to meet external financial demands,
and to maintain a democratic political system at
home. This conflict seems increasingly to be resolved
to the detriment of democracy.
To consider the latter aspect first, international
economic forces entirely outside the control of the
Bangladesh government played an important role in
the inflation and shortages within the Bangladesh
economy. In retrospect, these forces and the
dislocation caused by the war probably had more
effect than smuggling, corruption, and government
inefficiency.3 Bad harvests in many parts of the world
drove up food prices, the price of rice on the
international market rising more than five-fold
between 1970/71 and 1974/75. And after the Arab oil
boycott of late 1973, petroleum, of which Bangladesh
imports all its requirements, quadrupled in price.
At the same time, foreign aid, which had flooded into
the country after the 1971 war, began to fall off. It
was clear to the Bangladesh government by early
1974 that foreign food aid would still not cover
expected food deficits for that year. Consequently, it
made arrangements to purchase food grains from the
US. But with the rapid rise in international food
prices and a drastic fall in its own foreign currency
reserves it found it could not purchase that food
without special credit which the US refused to
provide because Bangladesh was selling jute to Cuba.
No new food sales agreement was signed until
October 1974, after the last jute shipment had left for
Cuba. By the time the food reached Bangladesh, the
famine had run its course, leaving somewhere
between 25,000 and 500,000 people dead, depending
on whose estimate one believes. International
economic forces as embodied in the IMF and the
World Bank also forced Bangladesh to devalue its
currency by 37 per cent in April 1975, worsening the
rampant domestic inflation.
As for more direct involvement by foreign
governments in the 1975 coups, there is no hard
evidence, although rumours persist of American
involvement in the first. Some observers have noted
that the three civilians with apparent prior knowledge
of the August 15 coup against Mujib who took part
3 It must immediately be said, however, that the Awami
League government of Sheikh Mujibar Rahman totally failed
to set an example of sacrifice and national service or to
mobilise the population for reconstruction and development.
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in the post-coup government all had American
connections: Mushtaque Ahmed, Taheruddin Tha-
kur, and Mahabubul Alam 'Chashi' had been
together in the Awami League government in exile in
Calcutta, 1971. And all three had participated in an
abortive secret Kissinger initiative to try to reach a
compromise with Pakistan. But the evidence
connecting the Americans with the coup remains only
circumstantial.
The first coup: August 1975
The key plotters were six young Majors and ex-
Majors of the Bangladesh army and a retired army
intelligence Colonel. The brains of the operation
seems to have been Khandaker Abdur Rashid,
Commander of the artillery unit in the capital,
although he has avoided public statements about his
role. Others in the planning group were Rashid's
brother-in-law, Farooq Rahman, who commanded
the Bengal Lancers tank unit, and two ex-Majors who
had been cashiered from the army because of their
conflicts with important Awami Leaguers: Shariful
Huq Dalim and Shamsul Islam Noor. There was little
ideology behind their coup beyond 'down with the
tyrant' sentiment. Planning for the coup probably
began several months before and by the time it took
place some 20-30 additional officers had been
brought into the conspiracy. The main force of the
coup was the tank regiment with its Russian T-54
tanks commanded by Major Farooq Rahman.
Moving out of the military cantonment area early on
the morning of August 15, this force assassinated
Mujib and a number of his relatives and very quickly
overcame all organised resistance.
The two Awami League politicians mentioned above
possibly participated in the planning of the coup.
Khandaker Mushtaque Ahmed, a conservative and
relatively anti-Indian and pro-American, was
appointed President. A civilian cabinet was sworn in,
which included many of Mujib's former ministers.
Some of the more corrupt or more pro-Indian former
Awami League politicians were arrested. The Majors
who carried out the coup showed themselves to have
no real plan for the country, nor did they have
strong backing in the army beyond their own tank
and artillery regiments and a limited number of
support troops. They did not attempt to assume full
command of the army or to displace the more senior
officers. An unstable situation developed, with the
Majors living in the presidential palace with
President Mushtaque Ahmed, protected by their
tanks.
The second coup and the soldiers' mutiñy: November
1975
On November 3, 1975 twelve weeks after the first
coup,asecondcoup occurred led by Brigadier Khaled
16
Musharrafthe army second in command. This coup
appears in part to have been a reassertion of the
hierarchy of command in the army against the power
wielded by the Majors. Khaled Musharraf was also
considered to be pro-Indian, and rumours circulated
that he had acted in coordination with the Indian
ambassador, Samar Sen. According to these
rumours, Musharraf planned to release Tajuddin
Ahmed and other pro-Indian ex-ministers from
prison and establish a government which would
invoke the India-Bangladesh security treaty of 1972
in order to obtain the support of Indian troops.
Before he could release them, however, Tajuddin
Ahmed and three other former ministers were
murdered in prison. Apart from this, the second coup
was pulled off successfully. Musharraf placed the
only officer senior to him, General Ziaur Rahman,
under arrest and he allowed the Majors and other
officers associated with the August coup to leave the
country.
After this however the situation quickly began to
disintegrate. Khaled Musharraf was widely regarded
as 'India's man', and this aroused intense opposition
within the army. This sentiment was combined with a
smouldering class-resentment in the ranks. It was at
this point that the Biplobi Gono Bahini (People's
Revolutionary ArmyPRA)the underground
armed wing of the JSD partyand the Biplobi
Sainik Sangstha (the Revolutionary Soldiers Organi-
sation) that the JSD and Abu Taher had been
organising within the army, emerged on the scene.
PRA organisers distributed thousands of leaflets
throughout the country's military cantonments on
November 5 and 6 claiming that the army officers
were exploiting the Jawans (soldiers) for their "own
selfish and ambitious scrambles for power through
staging one putsch after another". (FEER, December
5, 1975) and calling on the Jawans to rise up against
the upper echelons of the officer corps.
This appeal struck a responsive chord. On the night
of November 6, the soldiers began to rise, with a
force that was to shake the State in Bangladesh, in
the first soldiers' mutiny on such a scale since the
Sepoy Mutiny of 1857. Most of the troops of the 46th
Infantry Brigade in the Dacca Cantonment joined the
rebellion and began firing at Khalid supporters,
suspected Indian agents and collaborators, and those
considered 'corrupt'. General Khaled Musharraf and
a few other associates were assassinated. And a squad
of troops led by Colonel Abu Taher, organiser of the
PRA, freed General Ziaur Rahman and asked him to
speak to a gathering of revolutionary soldiers, which
he refused. He was also presented with a list of 12
demands by the soldiers. The first of these stated that:
"This time we revolted not for the cause of the rich
and also not on behalf of them. We revolted this
time along with the masses of the country. From
today onwards the armed forces of the country will
build themselves as the protectors of the interest of
the country's poorer class" . . . (FEER, December
5, 1975).
The others ranged from the immediate release "of all
political prisoners" to the demand that "all
properties of corrupt elements should be seized, and
arrangements should be made to bring back the
money from foreign banks of corrupt persons who
deposited there earlier.".
The soldiers also called for a new structure of
authority and decision-making in the army, including
the end of discrimination between officers and
soldiers; an end to recruitment of officers from the
privileged classes and through special schools, rather
from "among the soldiers" and changing of existing
"British military rules and regulations". A number of
demands were made for improved wages for soldiers
and free accommodation. Soldiers also demanded the
abolition of the 'batman' system where rank and file
Jawans were used as house and personal servants by
higher officers.
Although General Ziaur Rahman, in the pressure of
the moment, indicated his general agreement with
these demands, they obviously were not consistent
with the type of army he envisioned.
Troops from outlying areas poured into Dacca on the
morning of November 7 and paraded through the
city streets shouting slogans and firing their weapons
into the air. There were two different political strands
involved, some shouting in favour of the 'unity of
revolutionary soldiers, workers, peasants and
students' and others in support of Allah, Mushtaque,
and against India (FEER, December 5, 1975).
Officers and their families began fleeing the Dacca
cantonment area, there were reports of soldiers
ripping off the badges of rank from officers' uniforms
and a number of officers and soldiers were killed.
Under pressure from Taher and the revolutionary
soldiers, General Zia released JSD leaders A. S. M.
Abdur Rab and (ex-Major) M. A. Jalil. Upon their
release, however, Rab and Jalil called for the
extension of the rebellion, and urged the formation of
'revolutionary councils' among soldiers, workers,
peasants and intellectuals to help make the
proletarian revolution. General Ziaur Rahman was
meanwhile moving in the opposite direction, and
attempting to restore 'order' and the hierarchy of
command. He broadcast appeals to "all brothers in
the army" to remain at their posts and to remind the
population of the ban on public meetings,
demonstrations, and strikes.
Seeing the direction of events, Colonel Taher, Abdur
Rab, M. A. Jalil and other JSD leaders went
underground, but most of them were arrested late in
November and charged with 'sedition and rebellion',
under an old British colonial statute, along with 30
others, including 22 members of the armed forces.
They were tried several months later before a secret
military tribunal. In July 1976 Taher was sentenced
to death, Rab and Jalil got life imprisonment, and
there were heavy prison sentences for most of the
rest.
Thus the rebellion was crushed. An important
element in its failure was the lack of an organised
mass movement outside the army to link up with.
And yet the situation within the army is not the same
as it was before. After two coups and a number of
attempted coups, a major soldiers' mutiny and
several more minor ones and numerous acts of
'indiscipline' in the ranks, the unity of the armed
forces is demonstrably weak. And yet most observers
agree that the military in Bangladesh is the last
institution holding the traditional class and governing
structures together.
The military and internal security forces in
Bangladesh have been considerably strengthened
since the army came to power. The command
structure carried out a major re-organisation and
redeployment of the army in March-April, 1976 to
break up concentrations of potentially dissident
troops. A new Division was created to take charge of
security in the capital. According to reports
circulated by the JSD party, some 1,500 soldiers and
officers have been dismissed or tried for sympathy
with the Revolutionary Soldier's Organisation.
The budget allocation for defence and internal
security forces has been increased two-and-a-half
times, to Ta. 2194 mn, (about £80 mn) for 1976/77-
around 30 per cent of the total budget. Police forces
have been increased from 40,000 to 70,000,
including a new combat-ready Special Police Force
of 12,500. This essentially replaces Mujib's Rakkhi
Bahini, which was disbanded after the first coup.
Bangladesh has received substantial foreign assis-
tance in this build up of 'security forces'. In January
1977 for example the arrival of a squadron of US
Bell 212 military helicopters of the type used in
Vietnam was announced. These are evidently
intended for use by the tactical/mobile Special Police
Force. Britain, as part of its 'development' assistance
programme, has provided a grant of £720,000 for a
police telecommunications system to link up outlying
police stations. The US government has also quietly
sold $1 .5 mn. worth of telecommunications
equipment to the Bangladesh police and has
requested a $200,000 appropriation from Congress
for fiscal year 1978 to train Bangladesh military
officers in the US.
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There are many ironies in the way the situation has
developed since the coup. Ziaur Rahman had
supported Taher in many of the positions he put
forward on military matters in the liberation struggle
and afterwards. They had been 'close comrades in
arms'. And Taher and Ziauddin had helped build up
the reputation of Ziaur Rahman within the ranks of
the army as an honest nationalist officer. It is tragic
for the revolutionary soldiers that the General they
freed and re-installed as commander of the armed
forces should be the one to crush the soldier's
movement and execute Taher! And how ironic that
this General, who had been a nationalist and leading
patriot of the Bangladesh independence struggle
should come to head a regime which increasingly
depends internally on Bengali elements which did not
participate in the independence movement such as
the Muslim right, and the "returnees" in the
bureaucracy and the army (who now make up
50 per cent of the troops and 70 per cent of the
officers); and internationally on the nations which
actively opposed Bangladesh independence, the US,
China, and Pakistan.
When the soldiers rose in 1975, the history of
Bangladesh had reached a critical turning point at
which it was necessary either to go forward with the
revolutionary soldiers toward a new revolutionary
socialist army and society, or to retreat and make
alliance with conservative forces to try to preserve the
traditional military and social structures. Perhaps it
is not surprising that General Ziaur Rahman chose
the latter course-few senior military officers
trained in the traditional manner would have made
any other choice.
The political situation for the moment is quiet. There
have been two good rice harvests in a row. Prices
have come down. Landless labourers have work in
the new slack season rural works projects. The
military government is disinvesting nationalised
industries and encouraging foreign investment.
Foreign aid has been pouring into the country once
again. The majority of the popularion seems
unconcerned about the cancellation of parliamentary
elections originally scheduled for March of this year.
But this situation will not last indefinitely. The
Bengali population, long known for its volatile
political passions, will not for long remain content
with the lack of a political voice. The long-suffering
peasantry will not forever remain passive. And most
importantly the contradictions of slow and uneven
capitalist development remain.
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